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I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1972, three old-time dissenters came into
the offices of the New York Civil Liberties Union in Manhattan
and told an extraordinary story. In May of that year they and a
few like-minded others had drafted and sponsored a two-page
advertisement that appeared in the New York Times. The
advertisement was sharply critical of Richard M. Nixon, the
President of the United States. The ad claimed that President
Nixon had authorized the secret bombing of Cambodia, in
violation of international law, and should be impeached and
removed from office. The ad set forth the text of an
impeachment resolution that had been introduced in the House
of Representatives and contained an "Honor Roll" listing eight
House members who had co-sponsored that resolution. The
advertisement cost approximately $17,850, and the ad hoc
group called itself the National Committee for Impeachment.
Before the ink on the ad was barely dry, the group was sued by
the United States Justice Department for running the
advertisement.
When Randolph Phillips, one of the sponsors of the ad, told
this story to the lawyers at the New York Civil Liberties Union,
we were incredulous. How could a group of citizens be sued by
the Federal Government for publishing a criticism of the
President of the United States? After all, this was 1972, and
First Amendment law seemed at its most vigorous in the
protections of public speech, one of the shining legacies of the
Warren Court.' What possible justification could the
1. For example, eight years earlier the Court had granted unprecedented
protection from libel sanctions to the most vigorous citizen criticism of the
conduct of public officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW (1991). Three years earlier, the
Court had upheld the right to engage in advocacy of revolution and law violation.
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government have for suing this small group of protesters? We
soon discovered the answer: campaign finance reform. The
government was proceeding under the brand new Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971.2 Becoming effective in April
1972, the Act constituted a major revamping and expansion of
the federal laws governing campaign funding. Those earlier
campaign finance laws, which President Lyndon B. Johnson
once referred to as "more loophole than law,"3 had largely been
ineffective in regulating campaign funding, and reformers were
able to push for change in part because of the perception that
campaign advertising had gotten out of control.4
The Act had two features that were relevant to the
impeachment group: First, it defined a political committee as
any group that spent more than $1,000 in a calendar year "for
the purpose of influencing" the outcome of any federal election
and subjected such a group to new and substantial regulatory
requirements. Second, it had a special provision targeting use
of the media for any communication that was "on behalf of" or
"supported" or was "in derogation of" any federal candidate.
Before accepting any such advertising, a news medium was
required to receive a statement from the candidates supported
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). And just the year before, the Court had
invalidated a prior restraint against publication of the Vietnam War secrets
contained in The Pentagon Papers, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971), and had held that the public expression of even the most offensive
content could not be suppressed by government. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971).
2. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-41 (2000)).
Ironically, the lawsuit was triggered by an administrative complaint filed by
Common Cause against the impeachment ad group. Common Cause has
supported the regulation of such issue advocacy ever since.
3. Raid on Election Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1972, at 44. The FECA of 1971
inaugurated the first serious regime of disclosure of contributions. So effective
was the disclosure law expected to be that there was a frenzy of last minute fund
raising by Nixon's Committee to Re-elect the President to try to get those
contributions in before April 7, 1972, the effective date of the law. Some of the
undisclosed funds so raised would be used to subsidize the Watergate burglary
and lead to the sweeping campaign finance restrictions enacted two years later
and challenged in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Many have suggested that the
pre-April 7 frenzy of fundraising was strong evidence that a disclosure-only
regime would be very effective in deterring improper contributions. But we never
had a good chance to find out. There was also a spasm of last-minute fundraising
on the Democratic side as well. See generally Joel M. Gora, Campaign Finance and
the Nixon Presidency: End of an Era, in RICHARD M. NIXON, POLITIcIAN, PRESIDENT,
ADMINISTRATOR 299 (Leon Friedman & William Levantrosser eds., 1991).
4. One inspiration for the statute was the best-selling book by Joe McGinniss
called SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1968 (1969).
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or the opponents of the candidate opposed stating that the
expenditure would not cause the benefited candidate to exceed
statutory limits on candidate media expenditures. The
government's theory was that the impeachment ad rendered
the ad hoc group a "political committee" subject to all the law's
requirements, that the ad did not comply with the law, and that
until the group filed with the government and disclosed its
contributors, it could be enjoined from making any further
public statements.
Thus, the federal government sued a group of citizens for
spending their own funds to sponsor a newspaper
advertisement criticizing the President of the United States and
urging his impeachment. The government's reasoning, that the
ad might change people's minds about the President and thus
influence the outcome of that year's elections, and that this
would justify treating the group as political and subjecting
them to government regulation, resonates with the same
themes that contend in today's debates over campaign finance
reform. One can almost hear Senator John McCain referring to
the impeachment group's speech as a "sham issue ad," a
"corrupt" attempt by rich partisans of George McGovern to
corrupt the system and tilt the playing field. Surely, though, it
is outrageous for government to try to regulate core political
speech in that fashion.
A district court thought not, accepted the government's
theory and summarily granted an injunction-an extraordinary
prior restraint in the era of New York Times Co. v. United States.'
The Second Circuit quickly reversed, in the first decision of the
modem era striking down provisions of the federal campaign
finance laws because of First Amendment concerns. 6
Thus emerged the modern clash between campaign finance
controls and First Amendment rights. In Unfree Speech: The
Folly of Campaign Finance Reform, Professor Bradley A. Smith
tells the story of the constitutional, political, and policy battles
that have raged ever since over one of the most pressing public
policy questions of our time. Bedeviling the nation's political
community for almost thirty years, the dispute over how best
5. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
6. United States v. Natl Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972).
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to regulate political campaign funding-and hence political
campaign speech-has pitted free speech advocates against
good-government reformers, Democrats against Republicans,
and courts against legislatures. It has been a Thirty Years War
involving Congress, the courts, the political parties, the press,
and a host of organizations contending on one side or the
other. This year's pitched battles over the McCain-Feingold Bill
are the annual renewal of that war. Professor Smith's book
navigates all these cross currents in a highly readable and
balanced way that informs the reader of the basic elements of
the debate, while deftly skewering the key components of the
conventional wisdom, to wit, that sharply limiting political
campaign funding will prevent corruption of politics and
afford all citizens equal political opportunity.
Professor Smith, now Federal Election Commissioner Smith,
tells the historic, factual, doctrinal and political story of that
struggle: how to reconcile and harmonize valid concerns about
the way we finance our politics with the values and traditions
of the First Amendment. It is difficult to identify a public policy
question enmeshed in constitutional concerns over which more
ink has been spilled. The clashes over campaign finance reform
tend to be played out on our national political stage. Certainly
they have been in the last several years, with the primary
proposed legislation so prominently identified with a national
political figure like Senator John McCain.
Professor Smith has been one of the most prominent
campaign finance scholars in America and certainly the most
prolific of those scholars who have argued against the
conventional wisdom. His has been a distinctly eloquent voice
on the side of the debate which argues that campaign finance
controls and limitations cut too close to the core of the First
Amendment's purposes and that, indeed, such controls may
often be counterproductive to the very democratic goals that
are claimed to justify them.7 Smith's goal is to place concerns
7. Smith's articles, which provide the basis for many of the themes in the book,
include Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance
Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996); Money Talks: Speech Corruption, Equality and
Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. LJ. 45 (1997); The Sirens' Song: Campaign Finance
Regulation and the First Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 1 (1997). Other scholars whose
writings take a similarly critical view of campaign finance restrictions include
Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
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about the Constitution, the First Amendment, and freedom
"back at the fore" of the campaign finance debate:
For many years now, the bulk of both legal scholarship and
popular writing on campaign finance has been a literature of
regulation, not freedom. The nation's editorial pages pound
a steady drumbeat in favor of proposals to restrict campaign
contributions and spending, while the nation's law journals
are filled with articles, often sadly divorced from any
empirical analysis of campaign giving and spending, that
suggest ever more creative ways to regulate political speech,
on increasingly specious constitutional grounds. But as I
have taught and written about election law over the last
decade, I have become increasingly convinced that almost
everything the American people know, or think they know,
about campaign finance is wrong. Campaign spending is not
exploding, but in fact is rising at a slower pace than
advertising for most categories of consumer goods.
Although campaign spending is important, it does not "buy"
elections, and limits on spending seem to destroy electoral
competition. Far from corrupting the legislature, campaign
contributions seem to have remarkably little effect on
legislative behavior. And far from empowering ordinary
citizens and political outsiders, campaign finance
regulations have struck hardest at grassroots political
involvement. Furthermore, I have come to conclude that, in
fact, the bulk of campaign finance regulation is'
unconstitutional.8
The purpose of this essay is to assess the impressive way
Professor Smith achieves his ambitious agenda.
II. FIVE EASY CASES
The introductory chapter of Professor Smith's book begins
with the previously mentioned impeachment ad case and then
surveys four other cases in which citizens sought to speak their
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (1985); Joel M. Gora, Campaign
Finance Reform: Still Searching Today for a Better Way, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 137 (1997);
Stephen Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Reform, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 216 (1989); L.A. Powe, Mass Speech and the First Amendment, 1982 SUP. CT.
REV. 243; Daniel D. Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech,
1976 SUP. Cr. REV. 1; Roy A. Schotland, Proposals For Campaign Finance Reform: An
Article Dedicated to Being Less Dull than Its Title, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 429 (1992);
Kathleen Sullivan, PoliticalMoney andFreedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663
(1997). The bulk of scholarly commentary, however, tends to favor the
constitutionality and desirability of campaign finance limitations.
8. BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH x-xi (2001).
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minds or get their messages out and found themselves
ensnared in campaign finance laws.
A woman from Ohio printed up some homemade leaflets
opposing a local referendum to increase school taxes and
handed them out outside a public meeting of the school board.
A school official was offended at her leaflets and reported her
to the state election commission, which took her to court
because she had not put her name on the leaflets. It took a
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, one
invoking the memory of The Federalist Papers written under
pseudonyms, to declare that the First Amendment's protections
safeguarded her right to hand out anonymous leaflets critical of
government.9
A man from Long Island, together with a few friends, spent
$135 to print up and hand out some leaflets informing citizens
about the record of their local Congressman on tax issues. The
Congressman's aide complained to the Federal Election
Commission, which instituted federal enforcement proceedings
against the informal ad hoc group. It took an en banc decision
from the United States Court of Appeals to rule that the
Commission had grossly exceeded its authority in proceeding
in that fashion.'? A concurring Circuit Judge was even moved
to observe that the agency had "failed abysmally" in its duty to
enforce campaign laws consistent with the First Amendment."
In all three cases the speakers prevailed because they were
engaged in "issue advocacy," which the courts have held
cannot be regulated by campaign finance laws, as compared to
"express advocacy" of a candidate's election or defeat, which
the courts have held can be regulated.'2 One of Professor
Smith's contributions to these issues is to ask why we would
even permit this distinction under an unrestrained view of the
9. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 362 (1995) (citing Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960)).
10. Federal Election Comm'n v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately
Comm., 616 F. 2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
11. Id. at 55 (Kaufman, Cj., concurring).
12. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976). The Court's constitutional express
advocacy doctrine was thereafter codified in Section 431(17) of the FECA, which
defines an "independent expenditure" as an expenditure "by a person expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 2 U.S.C. §
413(17) (2000).
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First Amendment. The courts fashioned the "express advocacy"
doctrine as a positive barrier to limit the reach of campaign
laws to candidates, their committees, and those who explicitly
urge their election or defeat, so that those laws will not spill
over to flood and drown all discussions of public questions.
Professor Smith's final two representative cases illustrate the
problems we face, however, when we make First Amendment
protection turn on such fine distinctions.
In 1998, Leo Smith, a Connecticut man who supported
President Clinton in resisting impeachment, took issue with his
local Congresswoman, a Republican, who favored
impeachment. Smith created his own website to express his
views and linked the site to other locations which also
contained commentary critical of Republicans. A modem day
electronic pamphleteer, one would think, acting in the grand
tradition of a Tom Paine. Yet, the Federal Election Commission
determined that the cost of his website constituted a partisan
expenditure subjecting Smith to the enforcement rigors of the
federal election campaign laws. 3
Another successor to Tom Paine, albeit a much richer one,
got the same message from the government. Steve Forbes, heir
to the publishing empire, wrote a monthly column on public
policy issues for Forbes, his family magazine. He used the
column to speak out on all kinds of issues, particularly the evils
of the graduated income tax and the values of a flat tax
proposal. But as soon as Steve Forbes became a candidate
seeking the Republication nomination for President-a move
he was forced to take in order to proselytize his tax reform
message because he was barred by law from contributing his
own funds to Jack Kemp, the candidate who would best carry
that message-the Federal Election Commission decided that
the value of his monthly columns, which the government
bureaucrats calculated was approximately $94,900, constituted
an illegal corporate contribution to the Forbes presidential
campaign. The law allowed Forbes to spend $28 million of his
own money, which he made from his corporation, on a
campaign to express exactly those ideas, while threatening to
punish him for using a slight portion of that same corporate
13. See SMITH, supra note 8, at 8.
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money to make the same point in the form of a magazine
column. Forbes's right of free speech was surrendered the day
he became a candidate for the highest office in the land. As
PrQfessor Smith puts it: "[A]s a candidate, Steve Forbes had
fewer rights under the First Amendment than he did before
declaring his candidacy. Such a theory seems preposterous, for
it is hard to imagine a time when one would more want or
need to exercise First Amendment rights than when one is
running for office."14
How could it be, in a country with a First Amendment which
declares in unqualified terms that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press" that we
have come to this pass? We have rules which require citizens to
register with the government in order to criticize the
government. We have a set of federal campaign finance laws-
a speech code for political speech-whose distinctions and
categories of permissible and prohibited speech and exceptions
and qualifications would gladden the heart of a tax lawyer.
Under those rules, the right to criticize the government in any
meaningful way may turn on whether the activity is deemed a
contribution or an expenditure, express advocacy or issue
advocacy; whether the speaker is a corporation or a union or
another kind of organization or an individual or a committee;
whether the speaker is a corporation that makes widgets or a
corporation that makes widgets and also owns a newspaper;
whether a person's contribution to the political party he or she
believes in was "hard money" or "soft money"; whether the
party uses that donation to support their candidates or to
support their candidates' ideas. Similarly, the right of groups or
individuals to petition the government for a redress of
grievances would turn on whether their conversations with
their elected representatives could be deemed "coordination"
with the next election campaign of those representatives.' s
Professor Smith's book assays the answer to those questions.
14. SMITH, supra note 8, at 9.
15. See The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, S.27, 107th Cong. § 214
(passed by Senate April 2, 2001). The so-called McCain-Feingold Bill contains an
expanded definition of the kinds of contacts between federal candidates and
outside groups or individuals that can render the latter to be in "coordination"
with the former and subjects any subsequent speech by those groups or
individuals that pertains to that candidate to the limits of the FECA.
No. 3] 84 9
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And in the very process of asking those questions, he forces us
to think outside the box of the current debates over "soft
money" and "express advocacy" and "coordination" and to
come to grips with first principles. What is the best way to
finance politics in a democracy? What are the best rules to
honor the First Amendment's promised protections for political
speech? Is it really true, as prominent political figures have
suggested, that we have to choose between "two important
values in direct conflict: freedom of speech and our desire for
healthy campaigns in a healthy democracy[?]""6 Professor
Smith thinks not. He believes, rather, that you cannot have one
without the other. There cannot be a healthy democracy
without unfettered free speech. His book is a compelling
narrative of what has gone wrong, both constitutionally and
politically, and brought us to the point where leaders tell us we
have to choose between free speech and democracy.
Part I of the book, "The Costs of Campaigns and the Price of
Reform," starts out with a brief outline of the history of
campaign finance regulation to show how we got to our
present impasse. Then Professor Smith moves into his major
theme, which explores the bizarre nature of the campaign
finance system that we have devised, asking whether that
system serves or undermines the democratic values it claims to
advance. Do we need the convoluted creature we have created
in order to serve democracy, deter corruption, and expand
political opportunity? Part II on "Constitutional Matters,"
explores the doctrinal debates about campaign finance controls:
Are limits on money limits on speech? If they are, can they be
justified by the concerns with preventing the corruption of
officeholders? Can they be justified by the argument that
political equality requires campaign funding equality? Finally,
Part Ill addresses "Real and Imagined Reform of Campaign
Finance," discussing pending legislative proposals like the
McCain-Feingold Bill and Professor Smith's practical and
doctrinal alternatives that, perhaps, are more in keeping with
the teachings of the First Amendment.
16. SMrTH, supra note 8, at 10 (referring to remarks of House Democratic
Minority Leader Richard H. Gephardt).
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Ill. FINANCING PoLmCS: How WE GOT TO WHERE WE ARE
Professor Smith begins the main portion of his book with an
interesting history of campaign spending, regulation, and
reform efforts from Colonial times until the present. One
emerges with the clear sense that campaign finance problems
have been with us from the early days of the Republic and that
current debates over legislative proposals are re-enactments of
battles waged a century ago. Is it corruption for people or
institutions to fund the campaigns of candidates with whom
they are in ideological agreement in the hope or expectation
that if such candidates are elected, they will pursue policies
with which their supporters agree? Is that "corruption," or is it
simply "politics"? Should it be condemned or praised?
A. A Page of History
For the first fifty years of our nation's history there was little
campaign financing because there was little campaigning. The
electorate was small and narrow, and most campaign activity
involved party-sponsored partisan newspapers and pamphlets.
In the 1828 Andrew Jackson election, Martin Van Buren created
what we would now call a grassroots campaign which
"involved newspapers, pamphlets, rallies and candidate travel
in an effort to have the campaign communicate directly with
large number of voters." 7 In the first of what will be the many
ironies, paradoxes and unintended consequences that
particularly bedevil the campaign finance area, the creation of
the first popular mass campaign to elect Jackson required an
unprecedented amount of campaign funding to get the
message out and rally the troops. From the very beginning, the
expansion of democracy and the concomitant need for
expanded campaign funding went hand in hand. Similarly, as
the scope of government regulation expanded, so did
campaign funding by groups seeking to elect candidates who
would favor resisting such regulation.' 8
17. Id. at19.
18. Thus, for example, in connection with the 1832 re-election campaign of
President Andrew Jackson, the United States Bank, which Jackson had tried so
hard to extinguish, spent approximately $42,000-an enormous sum in those
days-on literature and advertisements in an effort to defeat Jackson. The Bank's
efforts were the forerunner of what today is called issue advocacy, i.e.,
No. 3]
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As the 19th century progressed, campaign funding of
elections grew in importance. By the latter part of that century,
most government jobs were based on the patronage or "spoils"
system, and a major source of campaign funding was from
government workers, who were often assessed a regular
percentage of their salaries as political contributions to sustain
the party in power. Concerned with the coercion inherent in
such a contribution system, Congress enacted the Pendleton
Act of 1881, which created the civil service system and
prohibited any federal employee from soliciting campaign
contributions from any other federal employee. This was the
first campaign finance bill, and the restriction was upheld by
the Supreme Court. 9
Ironically, the Pendleton Act and similar state laws caused
parties to lose the support provided by those assessments and
to turn increasingly to wealthy individuals to make up the
difference with large contributions. Thus, the reform of limiting
contributions by government employees opened the door to
the unintended consequence of making parties more
dependent on a small number of large contributors rather than
relying on a larger number of small donors. As a result, "fat
cats" took on an even larger role in party funding, and a
number of well-known captains of industry, such as Jay Gould
and John Jacob Astor, made the equivalent of six figure
contributions to the Republican Party, which actively solicited
such contributions with the message that their party supported
policies more friendly to business. As more corporate money
came into politics, more money was spent on campaigns."
Although both major parties had and relied primarily on large
contributors by this time, the Republicans were far more
"advertising that discusses political issues with the hope that voters will oppose
politicians who hold contrary views, without specifically calling for the election or
defeat of any particular candidate." Id. at 19-20.
19. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S 371 (1882). One Justice believed the restriction
violated the First Amendment because it hindered the ability of a person "to
promote the views of himself and his associates freely, without being trammeled
by inconvenient restrictions." Id. at 377 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
20. Presidential spending peaked when Mark Hanna of Ohio systematized fund
raising in an unprecedented manner by urging the necessity to business of a
victory over the populist "radical" William Jennings Bryan. Business contributed
"not in the expectation of policy favors but out of fear of the consequences of a
Bryan win, and in the firm conviction that a McKinley victory would benefit the
economy generally." SMrrH, supra note 8, at 22.
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successful at soliciting this group.
B. One Good Turn Deserves Another
By the beginning of the 20th century, a backlash against
corporate giving developed after the populist William Jennings
Bryan was defeated in his 1896 presidential bid. Four states, all
liberal pro-Bryan strongholds, enacted bans on corporate
contributions in part to retaliate against corporate support of
Bryan's opponents. As Professor Smith observes, "[slupporters
of these measures certainly thought that they were acting to
promote good government. Their idea of good government,
unfortunately, involved silencing those with whom they
disagreed."2' This resonates today, with much of the impetus
for new campaign finance restrictions based on the claim that
progressive or liberal legislation cannot be enacted because of
corporate or business lobbying and campaign contributions.
For example, the opponents of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
2001 repeatedly and explicitly insisted that the votes for that
bill were heavily influenced by political contributions by banks
and credit card corporations, even though eighty-three
Senators, including thirty-six Democrats, voted for the
bankruptcy law revisions that passed the Senate.'
Concern with corporate contributions to political parties led
to passage of the first federal law prohibiting such
contributions, the Tillman Act of 1907, a law pointed to today
as justifying a ban on soft-money contributions by corporations
to political parties. Laws requiring modest post-election
disclosure of contributions by Congressional candidates were
enacted, as were spending limits on House and Senate
elections, justified in part by the concern that only rich people
or people willing to take money from groups interested in
legislation could run for office. For various technical and
interpretive reasons, these laws, though quite ambitious on
their face, wound up having a minimal impact in restraining
federal campaign funding. Thus, another pattern was
established that we recognize today: Individuals and groups
21. Id. at 23.
22 See Phillip Shenon, Senators Adopt Tougher Rules on Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 2001, at Al; see also 147 CONG. REC. S2327 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2001)
(statement of Sen. Wellstone).
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are extremely resourceful in marginalizing campaign finance
restrictions, finding lawful ways to get around these
restrictions, using their resources to support their candidates
and causes.
The Teapot Dome corruption scandal, like its Watergate
successor fifty years later, had little to do with campaign
finance abuses. Nonetheless, it galvanized the cry for campaign
finance reform and resulted in the Corrupt Practices Act of
1925, which attempted to tighten up reporting requirements.
Once again, the pattern of finding loopholes began almost
immediately. In the forty-six years it was the law, before it was
superseded by the Federal Election Campaign Act we have
today, there was not one successful prosecution for violation of
its provisions.23
Up to now, almost all campaign finance reforms were efforts
by liberals, progressives, and Democrats to restrain the
campaign finance practices favorable to conservatives and
Republicans. The next two campaign finance reforms, however,
were imposed by Republicans on Democrats and their
campaign finance practices and supporters. First came the
Hatch Act of 1940, which expanded the ban on soliciting
contributions from government workers and prohibited civil
service employees from taking "an active part" in partisan
political activities. The Republicans' primary purpose was to
prevent President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Democratic Party
from using the greatly expanded federal bureaucracy as a
political campaign force. The Act also tried to tighten
contribution and expenditure limitations, but these limits were
soon easily avoided. Once again, reforms led to resistance and
loopholes.24
The Republicans also pushed for restrictions on giving and
spending by labor unions, which, by the 1940s had become a
potent political force and had spent money extensively to help
ensure Roosevelt's 1944 re-election. A key provision of the anti-
labor Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 banned union contributions to
candidates and also prohibited all union expenditures on
23. Id. at 26-27.
24. Id. at 27. The challenge to the Act's restrictions on partisan political activity
by civil service employees was rejected in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75 (1947).
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political activity, even including internal communications with
members. This unprecedented restraint on free speech was
challenged by the CIO News, indicted under the new law for
publishing an editorial in support of a local Democratic
congressional candidate. The Court avoided addressing the
severe constitutional problems raised by this attempt by
Congress to limit the political speech of its opponents by
holding that Congress did not intend the law to do what it
clearly did. Instead, the law was interpreted as inapplicable to
internal union communications.' When unions tried to test
Taft-Hartley further by making external political
communications, the government sued them once again. This
was the first time there had ever been a proceeding to haul a
group into court for speaking directly to the public about
political issues. The matter ended inconclusively, and the
Supreme Court did not rule on the merits.26 Despite these
rulings, unions remained powerful political forces whose
internal communications were unrestrained and whose
political action committees ("PACs") were growing each year
with money from automatic paycheck deductions.
C. Watergate and Reform
Campaign funding regulation remained dormant for the next
quarter-century, though campaign funding certainly did not.
By the time of Richard Nixon's high-spending 1968 presidential
campaign, including an eye-popping $2.8 million contribution
from insurance executive Clement Stone and his wife, the
pressures were building for another round of reform. The
result was the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the first
systematic revision of our campaign finance laws in almost
fifty years. Operating on the assumption that effective
disclosure would minimize or eliminate political quid pro
quos, the Act significantly tightened disclosure and eliminated
disclosure loopholes. The potential efficacy of disclosure as an
25. See United States v. Congress of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106 (1948). Four
Justices would have ruled that the Act did intend to ban such communications, in
violation of the First Amendment. Id. at. 156-68. Had one more Justice joined
them, we would have had an early constitutional victory for the proposition that
union "independent expenditures' cannot be suppressed by government.
26. United States v. United Autoworkers Union, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
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anti-corruption device was impressively attested to by the
frenzied flood of contributions that swamped Republican
committee headquarters in the days before the Act went into
effect. The Act also contained an unprecedented targeted
restriction on the amount that federal candidates could spend
on media communications, a provision legitimizing the use of
union members' dues to defray the costs of operating union
PACs, and a counterpart provision allowing corporations to
use their treasury funds to subsidize their PACs as well. At the
same time, the new law contained no effective limits on
individual contributions or candidate expenditures. The media
limit provision was later declared unconstitutional,' while the
PAC provision would give rise to the explosion of PACs in the
last thirty years, from a few hundred in 1972 to several
thousand in 2001. As Professor Smith observes: "Once again,
the results of reform were surprising: a measure intended to
strengthen union political activity led instead to increased, and
institutionalized, corporate political activity."2
It is ironic and frustrating that the disclosure provisions of
the 1971 Act were never really given an entire election cycle to
work. Once the courts had declared that the Act could not be
broadly applied to non-partisan issue groups and advocacy,
the disclosure provisions might have proven to be an effective
and focused antidote to undue influence and corruption-and
a remedy with only some First Amendment downside.29
Coupled with the existing bans on direct labor and corporate
contributions to candidates, disclosure might have made a
distinct difference. The rush to beat the disclosure deadline
seems to have proven that point.
But a disclosure-centered regime was not to be. Watergate
insured that. Even though not all of the abuses that we put
under the rubric of "Watergate" involved illegal or
27. ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041, 1054 (D.D.C. 1973) (3-judge court),
vacated as moot sub nom. Staats v. ACLU, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975). That court also
followed the lead of the Second Circuit in the impeachment ad case by holding
that the disclosure provisions of the Act could not be applied to the issue-
advocacy activity of issue-oriented organizations. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. at 1057.
28. SMITH, supra note 8, at 31.
29. The Court had held, after all, that compelled disclosure of the names of
contributors and supporters of cause organizations was a violation of the First
Amendment rights of freedom of speech and association. See NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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questionable campaign funding, Watergate seemed to have
become at least in part a poster child for campaign finance
excess and corruption. Revelation of the extremely large and
sometimes illegal contributions that came in before the new
disclosure rules went into effect helped energize a Democratic
Congress to push through sweeping changes in the fall of 1974,
shortly after Richard Nixon's resignation as President.
Those changes had four basic elements: (1) even more
enforceable disclosure provisions; (2) for the first time, public
financing of presidential campaigns-with matching funds in
the primaries and full public funding for the nominating
conventions and general election campaigns-but with the
condition that the candidate agree to statutorily-prescribed
spending limits; (3) severe limitations on contributions; and (4)
similarly severe ceilings on expenditures by candidates,
campaigns, parties, and even independent groups or citizens.
To monitor these new rules and regulations, Congress created a
new Federal Election Commission, a majority of which was
controlled by Congress.30 To those at the ACLU, these new
restrictions seemed not to be reforms but to constitute an
"Incumbent Protection Act," and the creation of an enforcement
mechanism wholly dominated by the incumbents in Congress
drove home that point. Just at a time that the courts seemed to
be infusing some First Amendment wisdom into interpretation
of the Act, Congress passed a statute that pulled out all the
stops and almost dared the Court to find it unconstitutional.
D. Buckley v. Valeo and the Law Today
That set the stage for the landmark challenge to these
sweeping restrictions in Buckley v. Valeo. The most intrusive
and restrictive parts of the law were the severe limitations on
contributions-no more than $1,000 to any federal candidate
from an individual or $5,000 from a political committee.
Equally severe were overall limitations on the amount that any
30. In addition, the 1974 Amendments had one other objectionable feature
which would be found unconstitutional: a disclosure provision targeted not at
candidates but at independent issue-oriented groups that rated the performance
of politicians. That provision, 2 U.S.C. § 437a, was struck down, as going beyond
the proper purview of campaign finance controls, by a unanimous Court of
Appeals that had upheld all other provisions of the new law. Buckley v. Valeo, 519
F.2d. 821, 843-44 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc).
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federal candidate could spend on his or her campaign-
expenditure limits set at such low levels that they were
guaranteed to insure that no challenger could ever defeat an
incumbent possessing all the perks of office unless that
incumbent were convicted of bribery or child molestation. Also
disruptive of political freedoms were disclosure requirements
which meant that any person who gave as little as $15 to a
political candidate or cause could have his name publicly
disclosed and his political privacy breached. Perhaps the most
outrageous limitation was a $1,000 overall annual ceiling on
political expenditures by groups or even individuals that
would make it a federal felony for a citizen to run a small ad in
the newspaper criticizing the President of the United States and
urging his defeat at the polls. The impeachment ad which the
government claimed could not be run without registration and
disclosure now could not be run at all without the sponsors
committing a federal crime. If the new law seemed a modern
reincarnation of the Sedition Act of 1798, which made it a crime
to criticize the government, provisions like this were the
reason.
The law was challenged by a "strange bedfellows" coalition
of liberals and conservatives. Senator Eugene McCarthy relied
on a small number of large contributors in 1968 to help him
and his "people's campaign" unseat President Lyndon B.
Johnson because of the war in Vietnam. His candidacy gave
voice to the anti-war opposition within the Democratic Party,
but his funding would now be criminal under the post-
Watergate reforms. Senator James Buckley, a conservative from
New York, was another candidate not part of the establishment
who had to look to outside sources for campaign support. They
were joined by an assortment of groups on either side of the
political spectrum, such as the New York Civil Liberties Union
and the American Conservative Union, who claimed that these
laws suppressed their ability to criticize government and its
officials in ways that undermined the whole purpose of the
First Amendment's rights of free speech and association.
The Court addressed these claims by rendering a Solomon-
like "split decision."3' The Court struck down limitations on
31. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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campaign expenditures, personal campaign expenditures, and
independent individual and group expenditures. These, the
Court reasoned, cut to the bone of the First Amendment by
limiting the quantity and quality of vital electoral speech. The
less candidates, causes, and individuals could spend, the less
they could say. Yet the Court upheld the statutory limitations
on contributions to candidates, on the ground that such "large"
contributions to candidates, even if properly and promptly
disclosed, could pose too much of a danger of corruption or the
"appearance of corruption." Likewise, the Court upheld deep
and intrusive disclosure of even the most modest contributions
to candidates, their campaigns, and those who "'expressly
advocated" their election or defeat, but struck down provisions
or interpretations that would impose disclosure and reporting
requirements on those who engaged solely in "issue advocacy."
The Court also upheld the provision of public funds for
presidential campaigns, rejecting claims that this was an
improper use of the Spending Power and that the formula for
eligibility benefited the Democrats and Republicans at the
expense of independent insurgent and third-party candidates
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. At the same time,
the Court struck down the composition of the Federal Election
Commission, chosen by members of Congress, as a violation of
separation of powers; at least the foxes would not be guarding
the hen house.
These split decisions would guarantee several unintended
consequences. First, since demand for campaign funds was
now unlimited, while supply was closely controlled, the
beneficiaries would be those candidates who had a Rolex or a
Rolodex, i.e. those who were independently wealthy and could
fund their own campaigns, like Steve Forbes and Senator Jon
Corzine, and those who were well-connected, like incumbents,
and could easily raise funds in $1,000 and $5,000 chunks from
individuals and political committees. Indeed, while forty
incumbents lost their seats in the 1974 elections before this law
went into effect, it is much more unusual for incumbents to lose
today. As Professor Smith points out, the imbalance between
fund raising by challengers and incumbents has been
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exacerbated and the fund raising gap has grown. 3 2 It is harder
now for newer voices to be heard. Because of the contribution
ceilings, candidates spend more time than before fund-raising
and dialing for dollars. Interest groups arose to fill the funding
breach. This is why the 1980s witnessed the rise of PACs, which
in turn generated a variety of legislative proposals to sharply
curtail or even outlaw them.
The second consequence of the compromise ruling in Buckley
was that, with candidate contributions so closely controlled,
other, less-regulated sources of funding for campaign-related
activity and communication would become vital. Hence the
Court planted the seeds of what we now call soft money and
issue advocacy. The lynch pin and dividing line between these
two regimes of regulation and non-regulation would be the
"express advocacy" concept: expenditures by candidates, their
campaigns, and those who expressly advocated their election
or defeat would be subject to contribution controls, deep
disclosure and other regulatory restraints. Other forms of
activity and communication by parties, independent groups,
and issue organizations which did not engage in "express
advocacy" would be wholly or largely free from campaign
finance regulation.
Those distinctions and divisions, though necessary to give as
much free speech protection as possible, had two fatal flaws.
First, they inaugurated an elaborate and bizarre free speech
code where the right to use funds to speak about politics and
government would turn on who you were, what you said, and
perhaps even when you said it. Second, they would guarantee
the instability that our campaign finance system has
experienced in the twenty-five years since then.
By the mid-1990s the regulatory battleground shifted to issue
advocacy and soft money, as interest groups, corporations,
labor unions, and individuals began more direct
communication to the public, but in messages that did not
expressly advocate electoral outcomes, and thus were free from
any governmental controls. Likewise, the rise of party use of
soft money permitted wealthy individuals, corporations, and
labor unions to make largely unregulated contributions to
32 SMITH, supra note 8, at 69.
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political parties so long as the money was not used in direct
support of candidates' federal elections. These funds support
the most basic political party activity in a democracy:
grassroots organizing, get-out-the-vote drives, voter
registration, candidate recruitment, issue development, and
advocacy. But their increase has led to renewed concerns over
undue access and influence by wealthy individuals and
powerful interests, which has led to the agitation over
proposals like the McCain-Feingold Bill, which would seek to
shut down all of this funding and the First Amendment activity
it sustains.
Throughout this twenty-five year period, the Supreme Court,
despite several invitations to do so, has declined to tamper
with the basic Buckley framework: expenditures are free,
contributions can be limited; express advocacy can be
regulated, issue advocacy is privileged; individuals can spend
to speak, corporations and labor unions can be restrained.3
As the comedian Joey Lewis always asked: "Is everybody
happy?"
IV. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
The unhappiness that most people feel about the current
state of affairs in the campaign finance arena has of course
sparked the ongoing public and legislative debates over proper
campaign finance policy in this area, a debate which almost
immediately proceeds directly to first premises and principles.
Professor Smith claims that these premises and principles call
into question the conventional wisdom about the merits of
regulating campaign funding and demonstrate, counter-
intuitively and almost perversely, that campaign funding
controls undermine the very goals they are claimed to achieve.
In Chapter 3 he powerfully debunks the conventional wisdom
about the values of limiting campaign funding, showing the
fallacies of four faulty assumptions upon which campaign
finance controls are predicated.
33. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985); Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652 (1990); Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 516 U.S. 604 (1996); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Govt PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897(2000).
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The first faulty assumption is that campaign spending is too
high. When one examines the overall amounts spent on
campaigning-perhaps $4 to $5 billion in 2000-that seems like
a lot of money.' As a result, the average citizen may think it
makes sense to reduce campaign spending directly, (by
outlawing soft money or issue advocacy), or indirectly, (by
providing public financing or other benefits to candidates only
on condition that the recipient candidates agree to limit their
overall campaign spending). In any event, Professor Smith
shows that in terms of dollars spent per eligible voter, the
amount of campaign funding is much more modest and works
out to approximately $15 per eligible voter. By another
measure, total United States political expenditures constitute
just .05 percent of gross domestic product, which, on a per-
voter basis, is less than is spent on political activity in many
other democratic countries.35  When one considers the
enormous stakes that every eligible voter has in the outcome of
the political process, that seems like a paltry sum indeed.3
The second faulty assumption underlying campaign finance
controls is that campaigns funded by large contributors are
undemocratic, whereas campaigns based on small donations
are more representative of the people. First, we do have
widespread participation in campaign funding. Professor
Smith estimates that approximately 18 million Americans make
some financial contribution to a candidate, party or PAC in an
election cycle. Next to voting, political giving is the most
common method by which voters connect to candidates,
parties and causes. Moreover, even candidates who raise large
sums in small contributions are not necessarily more
mainstream or representative. Indeed, more often than not,
they are ideologically extreme, which is why their intensely
devoted supporters are willing to contribute. Candidates like
34. Senator Mitch McConnell, an ardent foe of campaign spending limits,
frequently observes that we spend less on politics than on purchasing potato
chips. See 147 CONG. REC. S3234 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001) (statement of Sen.
McConnell).
35. See SMITH, supra note 8, at 42.
36. Ironically, while one consequence of coercing spending limits is that the
public will get less information than it needs (or more of it proportionately from
the news media not subject to these limits), with limits, more advertising will tend
to be negative, because with less to spend, it is more effective to spend it by
"going negative." Id. at 43-44.
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Barry Goldwater, George McGovern, and Oliver North fit this
profile. Conversely, candidates with a small number of large
contributors can often use those funds to amplify the views and
wishes of much larger groups. That is what Senator Eugene
McCarthy did in his 1968 anti-war campaign against President
Lyndon Johnson. Funded by a few rich liberals, his campaign
gave a voice to hundreds and thousands of liberal anti-war
Democrats who wound up unseating a sitting President. Ross
Perot used his millions of dollars in 1992 to give voice to
millions of Americans who believed his anti-government
message. He got 19% of the total vote cast and was thus largely
responsible for the electoral defeat of another sitting President,
George Bushpere. In these instances, large contributions served
a highly democratic purpose.
Nor is it correct that money "buys" elections-i.e., that
candidate expenditures determine electoral outcomes, thus
making the right to vote meaningless. Professor Smith
demonstrates that there is often a chicken and egg problem.
While there is a strong correlation between spending and
winning, it may be because donors like to back winners, rather
than because winners win because they have big donors. That
certainly accounts for the success of most incumbents. It is
campaign prowess and the prospect of electoral victory that
attract contributions, rather than contributions which generate
prowess and potential victory. Often, Big Spenders are Big
Losers. In 1994, for example, a bad year for incumbents, thirty-
five Republican challengers who defeated Democratic
incumbents spent on average just two-thirds of what their
opponents did. And in the 2000 Senate races, of the ten most
expensive races, the person who was outspent nonetheless won
four of the ten elections. As Smith notes, "Given the inherent
advantages of incumbency, this is powerful evidence that a
monetary advantage alone does not mean electoral success."37
Of course, there are occasional candidates like Jon Corzine who
do seem to rise to public prominence and electoral victory
because they have been able to spend large amounts of money,
but these are the exceptions that tend to prove the contrary
rule.
37. SMITH, supra note 8, at 49.
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Finally, the most deeply held belief that animates campaign
finance reformers is that money corrupts the legislative and
governing process. It is difficult to quarrel with this aspect of
the conventional wisdom about money and politics, since the
Supreme Court has put its seal of approval on the concept
without requiring any significant showing of the causal
relationship between campaign contributions and legislative
action. The Court, like the reformers, has been content to accept
the assertion uncritically rather than demand proponents
carefully prove the connection.38 Professor Smith refuses to let
that assertion off the intellectual hook. In a number of ways he
undermines the premises of that pillar of the conventional
wisdom.
First, "corruption" does not mean quid pro quo corruption in
the strict sense of campaign dollars in exchange for votes or
other political favors. In this context, it means responsiveness
or influence-i.e. that a representative will vote a given way on
a bill to please his supporters, particularly his financial ones.
Nowadays, almost any newspaper report on a legislative battle
contains a sidebar showing the campaign contributions made
by groups that support the legislation, with the clear
implication that the contributions played a role in the outcome.
But the unspoken predicate is that the representative is voting
that way because of the contribution, and that without the
contribution the representative would vote differently.
Correlation does the work of causation. It is the classic fallacy
post hoc ergo propter hoc: If Y follows X, Y must have been
caused by X. But usually the policy comes before the
contribution; the person has taken a stand on a given issue, and
38. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000). Justice Souter,
writing for the Court, dismissed "academic studies" such as Smith's which
indicated that "contributions do not actually result in changes in candidates'
positions" by citing other studies which "point the other way." Id. at 908.
Accordingly, the Court concluded, given the conflict among the studies "there is
little reason to doubt that sometimes large contributions will work actual
corruption of our political system, and no reason to question the existence of a
corresponding suspicion among voters." Id. Ironically, barely one month later, in a
nude dancing case, Justice Souter dissented on the ground that the government
had not proven the harm flowing from such speech in a convincing enough
fashion: "[I]ntermediate scrutiny requires a regulating government to make some
demonstration of an evidentiary basis for the harm it claims to flow from the
expressive activity . .. ." City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 120 S. Ct. 1382, 1404 (2000)
(Souter, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the contributors like that stand and support the person who
takes it in the expectation that he or she will continue to do
what he or she would has done in the past. Proof or even an
assertion that a specific legislator was influenced by campaign
contributions to vote differently than he otherwise would have
is never forthcoming from groups or politicians who claim that
money "corrupts" politicians. When pressed to name
individual Senators who have been corrupted by campaign
funds, the reformer's response is that it is not any one person
who is corrupt, but "the system" that is.
39
Not only do these anecdotal moments tend to refute the
reformers' claims, but academic studies have shown that
campaign contributions play a minor role in legislative
behavior. What controls official behavior is party agenda,
personal ideology, and constituent desires, as revealed in polls,
letters, calls, and conversation with voters.4 ° Moreover,
contributions often go hand-in-hand with electoral support; the
National Rifle Association ("NRA") makes extensive campaign
contributions to representatives, but they also have over three
million avid members. Representatives who vote against gun
control are probably much more impressed by the NRA's
electoral strength than their financial support. Conversely,
other groups have a great deal of political influence though
they have no PAC and make no contributions; the American
Association of Retired Persons ("AARP") and the American Bar
Association ("ABA") are classic examples. In short, the case that
contributions influence votes has never been made beyond the
realm of intuition. Nonetheless, the mantra that contributions
corrupt the system is repeated without limit, and the nostrum
of campaign finance reform is prescribed as a cure-all for the
policy ills that bedevil the Congress.
39. See 147 CONG. REC. S2936 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone); see also 147 CONG. REc. S3236 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001) (statement of
Sen. Kohl). In the recent approval of bankruptcy reform legislation, the airwaves
were replete with allegations that banks and credit card companies, which overall
had made seven figure contributions to candidates and parties, had basically
"bought" the policy outcome that favored creditors and harmed debtors. Yet, to
credit that assertion, one would have to believe that many of the eighty-three
Senators who voted for the bill, thirty-six of whom were Democrats, did so
primarily because of campaign contributions and were willing to face the wrath of
credit card users in the next election.
40. See SMrrH, supra note 8, at 55.
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If contributions do not in fact buy outcomes, do they at least
buy access, which is the other reform mantra? Again, the facts
are counterintuitive, but they show, as Professor Smith
observes, "the vast majority of campaign contributors never
seek access, and legislators meet regularly with people who
have never made contributions. Nor does every contributor
who seeks access get it."41 And even if contributors do gain
access, it may be for reasons unconnected to their
contributions. Broadcasters make contributions to candidates,
but also control television. Which one gains them the access?
Indeed, if there were no private contributions, the access by
broadcasters would be even more forthcoming. Yet, the media,
and thiough them the public, glibly and unthinkingly repeat
and believe the assertion that contributions buy access and
influence. Smith's careful argumentation clearly shows
otherwise.
In sum, Professor Smith shows that, contrary to the
conventional wisdom, it is not a good idea to limit political
spending, campaigns based on small contributions are not
necessarily more democratic than ones funded by large
contributions, and the case has not been made that money
"buys" elections or that campaign money corruptly influences
the legislative process. This chapter should be required reading
for everyone who think that there is "too much money in
politics."
V. THE FOLLY OF "REFORM"
So too, the next chapter dealing with the folly of reform and
the consequences of campaign finance regulation is a must
read. This chapter is a stunning indictment of the most illiberal
consequences of campaign finance controls. If Ted Koppell
devoted just one episode of Nightline to these themes, if Dan
Rather had just one segment on The CBS Evening News
presenting these points of view, the terms of the entire
campaign finance debate might change significantly. Once
again, Professor Smith shows that, despite popular and media
misconceptions, campaign finance limits, rather than reducing
the influence of wealthy individuals or expanding political
41. Id. at 59.
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opportunity, actually exacerbate that influence and reduce that
opportunity. His indictment of the folly of the present system is
stark:
Specifically, campaign finance reform efforts, based on ever-
increasing regulation of the political process, have
entrenched the status quo; reduced the choices of both
candidates and issues available to the electorate, while
contributing to the negativity of campaigns; made the
electoral system less responsive to popular opinion, while
favoring special interests; strengthened the power of select
elites; and limited opportunities for grassroots political
activity.
42
The winners of the current system have been incumbents and
highly organized interest groups, be they business or labor-
the very individuals and groups whose influence reform is
supposed to counteract. Likewise, contribution limits, in
tandem with the fact that the Court has ruled that the First
Amendment bars expenditure limits, clearly reduce the
number of candidates and favor wealthy candidates. Smith also
points out, again counter-intuitively, that contribution limits,
which force candidates to rely on a large number of
contributions, have the effect of restraining change, because
candidates are loath to offend their many contributors.
Historically, those candidates funded by a relatively small
handful of financial angels have often been freer to take bold
stands on policy.
Campaign finance limits entrench the status quo by favoring
incumbents, making it relatively more difficult for challengers
to raise money and make credible runs for office. Except for the
occasional self-financed multimillionaire like Senators Jon
Corzine or Maria Cantwell, challengers, faced with sharp
contribution limits, have a very difficult time raising the money
to get out the kind of message needed to challenge a well-
heeled and well-connected incumbent who can bring so many
of the perks of office to bear on the campaign. Contribution
limits make it impossible for challengers to rely on a few
financial supporters to support any message of change or
reform, and make it extremely burdensome for challengers to
raise adequate funds in limited amounts. Incumbents are more
42. Id. at 66.
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readily connected to the networks of interest groups that
supply contributions in $1,000 and $5,000 bites far more
efficiently. Even public financing schemes may be of little help,
since they almost all require those who accept public benefits to
agree "voluntarily" to limit their expenditures to a set ceiling
that is usually too low to mount an effective campaign.
The result of these restraints is to reduce the number of
candidates and to facilitate campaigns by the very wealthy.
Corzine, Forbes, and Perot have achieved prominence in the
world of politics because of their ability to spend the millions
of dollars they earned in the world of business. In the case of
Forbes and Perot, their money has sparked important national
debates about their issues, but the system can hardly be praised
for limiting the ability to raise those issues to the very wealthy.
Of course, had Buckley not been decided the way it was, such
rich self-financed candidacies would be illegal. But then we
would not have had the benefit of the national public
discussions those campaigns raised, and the "public discourse"
on vital public issues would be set at the extremely low and
meager level that a Congress full of incumbents chose in 1974.
Not only do funding restrictions limit the quantity of debate,
they also skew its content and quality. As Smith observes,
while there is a certain democratizing effect in making
candidates reach out to large numbers of contributors because
of low contribution limits, the result is that candidates have to
mute and moderate their message in order to appeal to a large
number of small contributors. This counters the "uninhibited,
robust and wide-open" public speech we are supposed to
have.43 Were it not for the sharper messages made possible by
the funds of a Perot or Forbes, our national debate might not
have included the importance of reducing the deficit (Perot) or
lowering taxes (Forbes). Two Presidents in the past decade,
Clinton and Bush fils, have taken those messages and made
them winning tickets to fashion governing electoral majorities.
As a result, Democrats are budget balancers and deficit fighters
43. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). The Supreme
Court understood a comparable centrist-forcing phenomenon in recently rejecting
blanket primary election arrangements where party nominees were chosen by the
entire electorate. Having to appeal to a larger group for support would
ineluctably cause candidates to water down their messages in order to do so. See
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000).
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and Republicans feel safer being tax cutters. This parallels the
days when third parties, backed by a few financial angels,
could slowly change the terms of our national debate and give
respectability and credibility to once-radical ideas like social
security.
Just as campaign funding limits restrain the development of
new political ideas, so too do they tend to entrench the
practices that campaign finance reformers claim to be
opposing. Contribution limits induce contributors to reject an
"electoral strategy" of trying to influence electoral outcomes so
that the candidate preferred by the contributor wins: with a cap
on contributions, each person or group's donation will likely
not make a difference. Instead, those limits push contributors
into adopting a "legislative strategy" of backing the likely
winner, usually the incumbent, to ensure access after the
election. Of course, that is the very problem of influence-
peddling that reformers claim to be addressing with
contribution limits. Limits also make the system less responsive
to the need for change since groups and individuals cannot
communicate or signal the felt need for change by making large
contributions to candidates. Finally, limits also produce
"shirking" by representatives in the form of having to spend
too much time fund-raising, thus neglecting their legislative
duties and avoiding taking stands that will offend organized
contribution sources.4"
The final irony is that funding limits favor selected elites who
can bring influence to bear on political processes in avenues
outside the area of regulation. The media are the prime
example. Because of statutory exemptions from campaign
finance regulation (and one would hope constitutional
immunity as well), the press can "influence the outcome of an
election" twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, through
coverage, emphasis, and editorial endorsement. So, far from
44. One prominent First Amendment scholar has suggested that even campaign
spending limits might be upheld to serve a compelling interest of elected officials
not having to spend so much time raising funds. See generally Vincent Blasi, Free
Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not
Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (1994). Surely a less
restrictive alternative would be simply to raise the contribution limits a reasonable
amount, say from $1,000 to $3,000, even if just to keep up with inflation. Then,
politicians would have to spend much less time raising money.
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being a populist bonanza, campaign finance controls simply
give more power to the rich who own or control news media.
Similarly, celebrity is not subject to campaign finance controls,
and many in Hollywood have been quite willing to donate
theirs to favored candidates and causes without restraint.
Barbara Streisand, Jane Fonda, and Martin Sheen readily come
to mind, as does Charleton Heston. On the other hand, the
millions of people who join together and pool their resources
through issue organizations and political action committees
have their influence restrained through laws which regulate the
funding and activities of their groups. What happened to one
person one vote?
The anti-democratic flaw in campaign finance limits is that
although they purport to level the playing field, equalize
political opportunity, and give a preference for populism, they
have precisely the opposite effect. Smith concludes his bill of
particulars as follows:
Campaign finance regulation has been packaged as a means
of returning power to "ordinary people." In truth, however,
such regulation has had the effect of excluding ordinary
people from the political process in a variety of ways: It has
insulated incumbents from the voting public, in both the
electoral and legislative spheres; it has increased the
incentives for legislative "shirking"; it has increased the
ability of certain elites to dominate the debate by eliminating
competing voices; it has placed a renewed premium on
personal wealth in political candidates, and limited the
number of candidates and the types of issues they discuss;
and it has hampered grassroots political activity.4
5
VI. ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION?
One set of proposals offered to counter the current campaign
finance problems is generally grouped under the rubric of
"public financing," or as Smith somewhat critically calls it,
"government financing" of political campaigns. Public
financing has long been offered as a panacea for both the
45. SMITH, supra note 8, at 86. Professor Smith has recently reprinted a number
of telling anecdotes which reflect how the bureaucratic obstacles of having to
comply with campaign finance regulatory red tape can chill and deter authentic
and spontaneous grassroots political participation and activity. Bradley A. Smith,
McCain-Feingold Will Hurt the Little Guy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2001, at A22.
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corruption and equality concerns that animate many campaign
finance reformers. If candidates and their campaigns were
funded with public money, concerns with corruption would
diminish and the playing field among candidates would be
leveled somewhat because each candidate would receive the
same amount in campaign funds, or at least candidates would
receive enough of a grubstake to run an effective campaign,
even if they faced a high-spending, privately-financed
opponent. Moreover, the argument goes, public funding would
"free" candidates from the chore of having to raise money from
private groups and individuals.
Public financing can take many forms: direct grants of funds
to candidates; matching funds to supplement private
contributions; provisions of a variety of benefits candidates can
use for their campaigns, including free mailing privileges
during an election season, free radio or television time,
government vouchers to purchase radio or television time, and
tax credits or deductions. Public financing usually but not
necessarily involves the candidate's accepting "voluntary"
expenditure ceilings as a condition of getting the public funds
or benefits. This traces back to the Buckley decision which
upheld - although not against an unconstitutional conditions
contention-the presidential spending program where
candidates agreed to spending limits in order to get the federal
funding.46
46. The Presidential public financing system at issue in Buckley gave matching
funds for the primary elections and full funding for the general elections. It
required recipient candidates to agree not to exceed various state-by-state ceilings
and an overall national spending ceiling in the primaries, as well as a nationwide
spending ceiling in the general fall election. The funding program was challenged
on Spending Clause grounds as an impermissible use of federal funds and on
Equal Protection Clause grounds because of the discriminatory eligibility
formulas that penalized certain candidates and groups. No argument was directly
made that the scheme involved an unconstitutional condition-i.e., surrendering
the right to spend funds on one's campaign in exchange for the receipt of federal
subsidies for that campaign. In the course of the opinion, the Court stated:
Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns and may
condition acceptance of public funds on the agreement by the candidate
to abide by specified expenditure limitations. Just as a candidate may
voluntarily limit the size of the contributions he chooses to accept, he may
decide to forgo private funding and accept public funding.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976). There are, of course, First Amendment
limits on the ability of government to wield its spending power. See, e.g., Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001). Finally, the Presidential public
funding has in many ways been Exhibit A for the flaws in limits-based public
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My favorite public financing scheme was put forward by the
public policy journalist Jonathon Rauch.47 Under his proposal, a
candidate in a typical House of Representatives race would
have two basic choices about how to raise campaign funds.
First, the candidate could raise money privately, in unlimited
amounts and from any source, even from corporations such as
Polluters, Inc., but with instant disclosure. Alternatively, the
candidate could receive a serious amount of public funding,
say $500,000, but not raise or spend a penny privately on top of
that. The latter candidate of course would have a powerful
campaign issue: "I'm the 'clean' candidate. I haven't taken a
dime in special interest money." Rauch thought that the
political capital a candidate would get might very well offset a
big spending campaign funded in part by Polluters, Inc. Of
course, no pending bill contains Rauch's ingenious scheme,
which is an extremely interesting marriage of the favorite
proposals of the left (full and significant public financing) and
the right (no limits on contributions). I suspect that is because
this is a decidedly anti-incumbent measure.
In practice, however, public financing has taken more limited
forms. Part of the problem with public financing is the paradox
of having the government finance the very politics which is
designed to control the government. Or, as Senator Gene
McCarthy liked to put it, explaining why he challenged
Presidential public funding in the Buckley case: Having, the
government finance political campaigns would be like having
the Founding Fathers ask King George to finance the American
Revolution.48 Also, as a political matter, the "strange
bedfellows" coalition put together in recent years to oppose
bills like McCain-Feingold, which currently have no public
financing provisions, would quickly come apart over public
funding proposals, which liberal groups tend to favor as an
antidote to the inequalities of private financing, but which
conservatives tend to see as "food stamps for politicians."
Assuming one can bridge these political divides, is public
financing. See discussion infra Part VII.
47. Jonathon Rauch, How To Repair the Campaign Finance System, Part . Give
Politicians Free Money, No Rules, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 29,1997/Jan. 5,
1998, at 54-56.
48. See John Lichfield, Notebook: Square Pegs Aim for the Oval Office, INDEP.
(LONDON), Dec. 29,1991.
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financing the solution to the campaign finance dilemmas and
conundrums? Professor Smith says that any public financing
system should be judged by how it performs on five factors: (1)
it should be easy to administer; (2) be flexible enough to
accommodate changed political realities; (3) encourage political
opportunity for newcomers; (4) allow competitive races,
particularly against incumbents; and (5) provide candidates
with adequate funds to communicate with the voters. He is
willing to acknowledge that government-financed campaigns
may address some of the campaign finance problems such as
inequality and candidate independence, but he is not
particularly confident that such programs will either work or
be enacted in good faith. Among his concerns are that
government-funded programs will tend to have eligibility
formulas that are geared to and reward past electoral success,
while being unresponsive to current electoral needs or
strengths (for example, a party gets funding if it polled more
than 5% in the last election, but not if it currently has support of
more than 5% of the voters). This can distort politics and lock
in certain candidates and parties. The ugly battle in 2000 over
who was the proper heir to Ross Perot's Reform Party and its
$11 million federal presidential subsidy, based on the Party's
1996 performance, is an example of that problem.
Smith's main concern is that the government programs will
be rigged either to discourage participation by new points of
view or to force almost all candidates into the government
system. The former concern is achieved by funding
arrangements that set thresholds for eligibility high, yet
spending ceilings relatively low. This way incumbents can
make it hard for newcomers to qualify, but ensure that if they
do, they will not be able to mount much of a campaign. Some
schemes try to coerce candidates into the government system
by employing mechanisms that make public funding the only
reasonable alternative unless one is a millionaire. One device is
to set contributions limits extremely low, so that it will be all
but impossible to raise private money for a high-spending
campaign, thus effectively forcing candidates into the system.
Another device to keep them in the public financing system is
to allow the spending ceilings to be raised if certain triggers are
tripped by nonparticipating candidates or even outside groups
No. 3]
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that run extensive campaigns.49 In addition, with candidates
dependent on government as with any other public benefits or
subsidies program, the possibility of political manipulation can
have a speech-suppressing effect. For example, Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani's recent efforts to prevent New York City from
offering an extremely generous $4 to $1 match for contributions
has threatened to wreak havoc in the fledgling campaigns of a
number of new candidates for seats on the New York City
Council. Another problem is whether public financing schemes
are designed only to benefit the two major parties and freeze
out any other electoral competition.50
Another problem is whether public financing will actually
increase political competitiveness. Smith observes that our
track record at using campaign finance regulation to increase
political participation and opportunity is a spotty one. Before
the passage of the FECA, challengers in House races tended to
raise about sixty-seven cents for every one dollar raised by
incumbents. After FECA that number ultimately dropped to an
all time low of twenty-five cents for challengers for every one
dollar for incumbents, hardly a blow for reform.5' Early
experiments with public funding in Wisconsin and Minnesota
do not contain clear evidence of a positive impact on increasing
electoral competition. Whether newer schemes will produce
more positive results remains to be seen. Perhaps we will have
less "corruption" with public funding, but it is not clear that we
will necessarily have more electoral competition.
There is one final problem with public financing. A real-
49. This describes Maine's "Clean Election" system, which was upheld against
the challenge that it was designed to have the effect of forcing candidates into the
limits-based public funding system by making it extremely difficult to raise
private funds and by allowing a public match against any private candidate who
tried to mount a strong privately-funded campaign. See Daggett v. Comm'n on
Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000). Although
that scheme made it relatively easy to meet the eligibility requirements,
participation levels so far have apparently been a disappointing 35%. In the 2000
legislative elections, only 116 out of 352 candidates participated in the public
funding system. See Mark Sappenfield, Wiere It Pays To Fundraise, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 12,2001.
50. That is what then-Justice William H. Rehnquist referred to in Buckley when
he said the law "enshrined the Republican and Democratic Parties in a permanent
preferred position." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 293 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. See SMITH, supra note 8, at 99.
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world example suggests that public financing does not work. In
one particular election there is full public funding, not a dime
of private contributions, in which candidates can only spend
what they receive from the government, yet it has led to what
many claim are enormous abuses. I am referring to the system
of presidential public financing, which has helped to spawn the
soft money and issue advocacy systems which current
legislation would try to outlaw or control. The reason is
obvious: Despite the enormous public funds available for the
major parties' presidential campaigns, the parties and
concerned interest groups still feel the need to raise and spend
more to get their messages out. While limits-driven public
funding may work in some isolated local levels-New York
City is frequently credited with having a "model" public
financing program-on a national basis it is questionable
whether limits will work as a central feature of such a plan.
Finally, there is an alternative approach which Professor
Smith does not elaborate but which might serve both reform
and free speech goals. That is a program of "floors without
ceilings." It would make public benefits and resources available
equally to all qualified candidates, but without requiring the
acceptance of "voluntary" limits in return. All candidates
would be eligible for a variety of benefits, not just a
government check for their entire campaign, so that they are
not dependent on just any one source. The public funds may
not mean that much to the well-heeled candidate, but can
provide a vital platform to the candidate without ample
personal or other resources. While such a proposal has been
called politically naive and with little chance of passage, how
happy are people with the private system for funding
congressional elections? Or with the presidential public
funding system? Floors without ceilings may be the First
Amendment-friendly way to provide public resources to
candidates and campaigns. On the other hand, current
legislative proposals, which are only about limits and contain
no basic public benefits for candidates, can more properly be
thought of as "ceilings without floors."
VII. HONORING THE CONSTITUTION
Having concluded that, as political and policy matters,
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restrictions on private financing of campaigns do not work and
that public financing of campaigns is problematic, Professor
Smith then turns his attention to the constitutional arguments
against restrictions on private financing.
This part of the book revisits the constitutional issues that
were first raised and resolved in Buckley and which have not
changed substantially since. Buckley has gotten bad press over
the years, being compared to notorious cases such as Lochner v.
New York52 and Plessy v. Ferguson,3 cases where the Court is
thought to have veered off track by reading its own prejudices
into the Constitution, requiring a generation before later courts
could bring about a course correction. Three lines of attack
have been advanced: (1) that it was wrong to treat limits on
campaign funding as limits on campaign speech and thereby
subject them to strict scrutiny; (2) that it was wrong to
recognize "corruption or the appearance of corruption" as the
only compelling interests which might justify controlling
campaign funding-the Court should have allowed
government to prevent the reality and appearance of undue
influence as well; and (3) similarly, that the Court's refusal to
allow government to "restrict the speech of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others" was
a failure to temper First Amendment rights with countervailing
Equal Protection, one person one vote principles. In three crisp
and well-reasoned chapters, Professor Smith addresses and, I
think, effectively answers these critics of Buckley.
A. Is Money Speech?
That of course is not the question, but framing it that way has
allowed Buckley critics to attack the ruling as saying that money
is speech. Back then, as now, some took the position that the
FECA did not limit speech, it simply limited the use of
property, and therefore was subject to much less exacting
judicial scrutiny.T 4
52. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
53. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
54. That view was most prominently associated with Circuit Judge J. Skelly
Wright, who sat on the appeals court that upheld all of the Act's funding limits
and who wrote two law review articles condemning the Buckley ruling. See J.
Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle
to Political Equality? 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the
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There were two arguments in Buckley as to why limiting
political funding was not a direct limiting of political speech
warranting strict scrutiny. The first was that giving and
spending funds on political activity was "conduct," not speech,
thereby subject to reasonable regulation like the hours of a
parade.5 A related argument was that limiting the amount of
money spent on speech was akin to limiting the volume from a
bullhorn: It regulated decibels not speech.56 The "money is not
speech" argument seems to be the weakest attack on Buckley. A
law which says a person may not spend more than $1,000 on a
newspaper ad is a law that limits that person's speech once that
amount has been spent. Once the ceiling is reached, the limit
acts as a continuing and permanent restraint on the person's
ability to publish his opinion. True, a person remains free to
utter and write words on the subject, but the costs of
amplifying one's voice beyond one's immediate audience is
effectively shut off and the speaker silenced.57
The Court took this common sense approach in noting that
all of the essentials of effective communication in an age of
mass communications required the expenditure of funds to be
effective: money to print leaflets, banners, rent a hall, hire
campaign aides, provide office expenses, all of which are
necessary to get the message out. In the Court's analogy,
campaign funding limits are like being free to exercise your
right to travel and drive a car as far as you can on only one
single tank of gas.58 The Court rejected treatment of funding as
Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE LJ. 1001 (1976). In the current Court, Justice
Stevens has squarely declared that regulation of campaign funding is merely
regulation of property and easily subject to regulation: I make one simple point.
Money is property; it is not speech." Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct.
897, 910 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
55. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16-17 (relying primarily on United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968), which upheld prosecution for burning a draft card in symbolic
protest against the war in Vietnam).
56. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18 n.17 (relying on Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949), which had upheld the authority of a municipality to ban sound trucks
which emitted "loud and raucous" noises).
57. By the same token, a law which said a person could spend no more than
$1,000 in a year on his or her religious activities or contribute no more than $1,000
a year to the church of his or her choice, would surely be found to "prohibit the
free exercise" of religion. No less should be said of a law which abridges the
parallel rights of free speech in a comparable way. With regard to both religious
activity and political speech, the First Amendment commands that government be
neutral and agnostic.
58. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 n.18.
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though it were conduct, reasoning that the limits directly
restrained speech: "A restriction on the amount of money a
person or group can spend on political communication during
a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached."5 9
Treating limits on funding as limits on speech was also
consistent with cases the Court had decided before Buckley and
that the Court has decided since. For example, the challengers
in Buckley centr~lly relied on the landmark citizen-advocacy
case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,60 a case which is often
celebrated even by those who have disdain for Buckley,61 where
the Court held that just because a civil rights issue
advertisement in a newspaper had been purchased did not turn
it into a regulatable commercial transaction or otherwise
deprive it of First Amendment protection. Since Sullivan, the
Court has repeatedly recognized the crucial link between limits
on funding and limits on speech. When New York said that
publishers could not pay convicted criminals for writing about
their crimes, the Court dispatched the restraint handily even
though the restraint was less stifling than Buckley's funding
limits. Under the New York statute, the convicts could still
publish as long as they were not paid.6 The Court had no
trouble finding the law a content-based restraint on speech
requiring and failing strict scrutiny.6 Likewise, when Congress
said that federal employees could not receive moonlighting
fees for "an appearance, speech or article," another restraint
that in no way prevented an article from being written or a
speech from being given, the Court found that this prohibition
on being paid "unquestionably impose[d] a significant burden
on expressive activity,"64 and struck it down even though it
59. Id. at19.
60. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
61. See, e.g., ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW (1991).
62. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105 (1991).
63. Id. at 116-18.
64. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1995).
The majority opinion was written by Justice Stevens, who thinks that in the
campaign finance setting money is property, not speech; yet, he was not willing to
tell the government worker that the ban on speech honoraria was only a property
restriction.
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involved government employees, who generally have fewer or
lesser First Amendment rights than other citizens.6 5
Lastly, there are critics of Buckley who do not hesitate to
invoke the First Amendment when the government withholds
funds from certain groups on certain conditions that interfere
with those groups' expression. So, for example, when the
government said that public funds could not be used to counsel
abortion, it was argued to be an impermissible restriction of
speech,66 and when government said that legal-services
organizations could not use government funds to make certain
arguments on behalf of clients in court, that was similarly
claimed to violate the free-speech guarantee of the First
Amendment.67 But, when government tells private citizens and
groups that they may not use their own funds to spread their
own message, that is dismissed as a regulation of conduct
rather than a restriction on speech. I don't think one can have
this argument both ways.
B. Are Campaign Finance Limitations Subject to Strict Scrutiny?
Once it is determined that limits on the giving or spending of
campaign funds are limitations on the campaign speech they
support, the remaining question is whether the law is a
content-based restriction that can withstand strict scrutiny. On
its face, a campaign finance limitation is based on content
because what triggers it is giving or spending money "for the
purpose of influencing" the outcome of an election or for
"expressly advocating the election or defeat" of a federal
candidate.68 The explicit political content of the speech or
activity subjects it to the rigors of the law. Also, the desire to
regulate campaign expenditures is triggered by the impact the
message will have on the audience. For these reasons, the
65. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) ("[The] State
has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ
significantly from those it possesses in [regulating] the speech of the citizenry in
general.").
66. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991). Nevertheless, the Court in Rust
ruled the government action constitutional.
67. The Supreme Court, happily, agreed. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez,
121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001).
68. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8)(a) (defining contribution), (9)(a) (defining
expenditure), (17) (defining independent expenditure) (2000).
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restraints are content-based.69
There is even a credible argument that campaign finance
restrictions are viewpoint-based, the most suspect form of
government regulation, in that they are motivated by a desire
to suppress certain ideas. The debates over campaign finance
reform are replete with references to the "special interest"
money that dictates legislative outcomes. In almost all
instances, the outcomes "dictated" are conservative outcomes
and the special interests assaulted are right-wing or business
and commercial interests. Thus, campaign finance reform is
claimed to be necessary before we can have meaningful gun-
control policies, meaningful environmental regulation, and a
real patients' bill of rights. Without campaign finance reform, it
is asserted, we are defenseless against laws that benefit the
telecommunications industry, the pharmaceutical industry and,
most recently, the banking and credit card industry, with its
campaign contributions and lobbying for the bankruptcy
reform bill. Although eighty-three Senators voted for that bill,
thirty-six of them Democrats, we were still treated to nightly
arguments that the bill was passed only because of campaign
contributions by the big banks and credit card companies.7 0
According to this criticism, banning these contributions could
have prevented those bad bills. Rarely does one hear that we
need campaign finance controls in order to advance
conservative or business interests; one might suspect that
campaign finance limits are basically a cover for liberal attacks
on conservative interests.
Smith's conclusion concerning strict scrutiny seems
unexceptional:
Gifts of money, and the expenditure of money, are forms of
speech. Across-the-board regulation of monetary gifts and
spending is not content neutral, and if it were, one suspects
that many of the most ardent campaign finance regulation
proponents would lose interest in the subject. Campaign
finance regulation attempts to limit speech precisely for its
communicative value, and does so in ways that are not
content neutral. Furthermore, it significantly interrupts the
69. Cf Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
70. See 147 CONG. REC. 2324-27 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2001) (remarks of Senator
Wellstone).
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flow of information by silencing certain voices and limiting
the total amount of communication between candidates and
the public. Thus strict scrutiny, as provided for in Buckley, is
entirely appropriate.71
Unfortunately, as Professor Smith's book shows, the Buckley
Court applied strict scrutiny in a less than strictly consistent
way.
C. Do Campaign Finance Limitations Survive Strict Scrutiny?
1. The Interest in Controlling "Skyrocketing" Campaign Spending
Three interests were claimed by supporters of the limitations
in Buckley to be sufficiently compelling to justify the across-the-
board restraints on political giving and spending that Congress
had imposed.72 The first interest asserted was the putative need
to control skyrocketing costs that had made political campaigns
too expensive, causing them to degenerate into "Romanesque
political extravagances."73 That interest was rejected as illicit by
the Court with a burst of First Amendment absolutism: "In the
free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the
government, but the people-individually as citizens and
candidates and collectively as associations and political
committees-who must retain control over the quantity and
range of debate on public issues in a political campaign."74
2. The Interest in Preventing "Corruption"
or the "Appearance of Corruption"
The one interest the Buckley Court held to be compelling was
the interest in guarding against "corruption" or "the
appearance of corruption." While this interest could not sustain
limits on personal expenditures, campaign-committee
expenditures, or independent-group expenditures because the
link to corruption was too attenuated,' the interest could
71. SMITH, supra note 8, at 121 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,16 (1976)).
72 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1976).
73. Id. at 26; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d. 821, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en
banc).
74. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57.
75. See id. at 45-46, 53, 55-56.
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sustain limits on "large" contributions.76 The Court comforted
itself in drawing the much-criticized expenditure/contribution
distinction by reasoning that contributions to a candidate or
cause are somehow lesser speech -"symbolic" or "proxy"
speech that is less deserving of protection. Making a political
contribution, however, is the most wide-spread form of
political participation, next only to voting. Moreover, anyone
who has been angered by something on the evening news and
then dashed off a small check to some cause addressing that
issue knows how making a contribution to a candidate or cause
is a fundamental political act, like voting, signing a petition, or
writing a letter to the editor. By putting the "proxy speech"
label on contributions, the Court was able to give the restriction
indifferent scrutiny.
This lesser scrutiny took the form of accepting the claims,
based on intuition and anecdotal evidence, that large disclosed
contributions were inherently likely to corrupt and required a
prophylactic ceiling, regardless of the circumstances of the
contribution or the motivation of the contributor. The Court
accepted the incantation, repeated today like a mantra, that
contributions "corrupt the system," and "large contributions"
improperly buy access and influence. In these claims of
corruption, no specific representative is charged with acting
corruptly, but "the system" is corrupt or corrupting. The
allegation is simply made that large contributions by interested
industries to candidates and parties skew legislative outcomes.
For example, such claims were made during this season's
debate over bankruptcy reform, but none of the eighty-three
Senators who voted for the bill has been identified as corrupt.
These allegations are similar to claims made a generation ago,
also with little effort to identify individual perpetrators, that
communism was "corrupting" the government.77 Likewise, the
76. See id. at 26-27.
77. See George Will, Drops in the Bucket, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2001, at A29.
McCainism, the McCarthyism of today's "progressives," involves, as
McCarthyism did, the reckless hurling of imprecise accusations. Then, the
accusation was "communism!" Today it is "corruption!" Pandemic
corruption of "everybody" by "the system" supposedly justifies campaign
finance reforms. Those reforms would subject the rights of political
speech and association to yet further government limits and supervision,
by restricting the political contributions and expenditures that are
indispensable for communication in modem society.
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Court's watered-down deferential standard in the face of
claimed "corruption" is reminiscent of formulas used to sustain
investigations of communism and subversion a generation
ago.78 The normal First Amendment insistence that there be a
direct link shown connecting the speech and the harm
allegedly flowing from the speech 79 has been short-circuited.
Perpetuating the contribution/ expenditure distinction with
minimal inquiry and treating contributions to candidates as a
First Amendment stepchild has forced the law in this area into
the detailed speech code and "covert speech" phenomenon that
Justice Kennedy bemoaned in his Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC dissent.80
Professor Smith, on the other hand, points to studies that
"have consistently found little or no connection between
campaign contributions and legislative action."8 '
Unfortunately, the Court brushed aside such studies in its
recent decision in Shrink Missouri Government PAC.82 Requiring
of the government little more than assertion and intuition, the
Court upheld a $1,000 contribution ceiling on donations in state
elections. The Court reasoned that the government was to be
given deference in trying to protect not just against
"corruption," but also against "the perception of corruption" in
a system where there are large private contributions to political
candidates.' Professor Smith concludes that "the weakest
portion of the Buckley decision and its progeny, from a
standpoint of constitutional doctrine, is not that portion which
struck down spending limits but rather that portion which
relies on the anti-corruption rationale to justify limits on
contributions."
84
Id.
78. For an example of the Court's reasoning in the communism cases, see
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
79. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
80. 528 U.S. 377,406 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
81. SMrTH, supra note 8, at 127.
82. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 377 (2000).
83. Id. at 390.
84. SMITH, supra note 8, at 136.
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3. The Interest in "Equalizing" Political Speech
To the extent that the concern with contributions is about
unequal access by contributors to politicians, rather than undue
influence, the concern is not about corruption, but about
equality, the other argument claimed to sustain systematic
campaign finance controls.' For example, the current push to
ban soft money and restrict independent-advocacy campaigns,
based in part on the corruption claim, is also based on the
proposition that rich people and organizations are "drowning
out" other voices.
The goal of equalizing political voices was the third
compelling interest asserted by supporters of the limitations in
Buckley.86 This claim was rejected by the Court as an
impermissible objective:
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment,
which was designed "to secure 'the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources, "' and "'to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people. "87
The part of Buckley that draws the greatest ire is the first part
of this passage, in which the Court states that limiting one
person's speech in order to enhance that of another is "wholly
foreign to the First Amendment." Frequently omitted in these
arguments, however, is the rest of the sentence, which
emphasizes that the reason for this is to insure that the public
receive as much information as possible from a variety of
diverse and antagonistic sources.
Justified rhetorically by phrases like "leveling the playing
field," that rich people shouldn't "buy elections," and honoring
the principle of "one person, one vote," the campaign finance
advocates and their enablers in the academy have been
pressing for limits on campaign funding on the claim that
democracy and the First Amendment each embody an
85. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C.
DAviS L. REv. 663 (1997).
86. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1976).
87. Id. at 48-49 (emphasis added) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254,266,269 (1964) (citations omitted)).
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egalitarian imperative that justifies, if not compels, such
restraints. It takes a good deal of intellectual heavy lifting to
transform the libertarian, negative text, and doctrinal history of
the First Amendment, as well as the Equal Protection Clause,
into a theory that permits government management and
modulation of the free marketplace of ideas.88 Based on
"republican" or "communitarian" concepts of the need to
accommodate individual rights to societal needs, two
approaches have emerged to justify campaign funding controls
on equality or egalitarian grounds.89
One approach, described as the "enhancement theory," holds
that there some ideas and speakers are under-represented and
under-heard and that government is partly responsible for
creating the property rights framework in which some have
greater economic resources enabling them to speak or publish
while others remain silenced. Because government is partially
responsible for this imbalance, it is permissible for government
to take steps to right the balance by testing campaign finance
restrictions through the prism of a "democracy-centered"
reading of the Constitution. This concept, however,
reintroduces the same problem of whether the interests of
equal participation can justify restraining individual speech. In
particular, this theme raises two problems: (1) how to identify
88. The effort was first attempted in the late 1960s under the rubric "access to
the media." The theory was that, because the ownership of the news media was
concentrated in a few corporate hands, the government had to guarantee
individual access in order to prevent corporate owners from monopolizing the
marketplace of ideas. For a forceful articulation of this theory, see Jerome Barron,
Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967).
Aided by the physical limitations on the number of television frequencies, the
theory had a modicum of success in the broadcasting area. Compare Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding an FCC order that a
broadcaster must provide reply time ito the object of a personal attack in a
program) and CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (holding that broadcasters
must provide "reasonable access" to a candidate for federal office), with Columbia
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (holding that
broadcasters were not required to accept paid editorials). The theory failed
spectacularly in the print media context when the Court unanimously rejected a
newspaper "right of reply" statute sought to be justified on a modulating theory
of the First Amendment. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
89. See SMITH, supra note 8, at 138 (citing Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986); Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-
Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1055 (1999); Cass
Sunstein, Free Speech Now, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE MODERN STATE
(Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992)).
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which ideas or speakers have been under-represented; and (2)
how to develop governmental mechanisms to make that
assessment and administer the enhancement.
Deciding whose speech is underrepresented under such a
regime raises intractable First Amendment concerns. What
about the speech of rich people that seems to favor the
despised and the disenfranchised? Does that become privileged
because of its objective? If you lavishly fund a campaign
finance "reform" organization, that is democratic speech. But, if
you fund an organization that opposes campaign finance limits
on the ground that it will harm democracy, is that subject to
democratic restraint? Carried to the extreme, these
enhancement theories become the worst kind of excuse for
government censorship of views on "the right," i.e., bald-faced
viewpoint-based suppression of speech.
Another problem with these theories is that the government
mechanism would have to be all encompassing, equalizing, or
enhancing, not only of speech by candidates and parties, but of
speech by issue organizations and the media as well, in order
to make sure no one group or individual has too much
influence because of their wealth and resources.9" The kind of
war-time-style regime necessary to manage this system seems
"wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Although some of
the rhetoric in support of a ban on soft money or well-funded
issue advocacy within two months of an election is steeped in
the equality rational, even those heavy regulatory campaign
finance bills are tame by comparison to some of these
proposals.
Finally, there is an even more ambitious, egalitarian
approach that Professor Smith assesses. This approach,
anchored in the theory that such action is not only permitted by
the First Amendment but required by the Equal Protection
Clause, would seek equal speech status for all voters or citizens
by outlawing all private financing of politics. Instead, the
government would fund all partisan politics either with direct
and equal grants to all viable candidates or by providing voters
90. One scholar, Richard Hasen, has honestly pursued the theory to its logical
extreme and would include the news media and their owners in campaign finance
controls and regulations in order to pursue the egalitarian ideal. Richard L. Hasen,
Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1999).
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with vouchers that they could give to the party or candidate of
their choice, who could use only those vouchers for their
campaigns. This is basically a proposal to nationalize politics.
Neither the state action doctrine, the "one person, one vote"
rule, the right to vote, nor the combination of all of those
concepts can comfortably be stretched so far as to require
treating candidates, parties, and issue groups as though they
were government employees and political speech contrary to
government as though it was government speech. "One person,
one vote" is a rule for the ballot box, not the soap box, and
cannot support a regime of "one person, one paragraph."
VIII. FACING THE FUTURE
Well, as Lenin once asked, "What is to be Done?" If
corruption, equality, sound public policy, and democratic
values cannot justify campaign finance limits, and public
financing is a flawed and partial remedy, what does Professor
Smith propose instead? Part III of his book addresses this
question. Anyone who has read this far will not be surprised at
his proposed solutions.
A. The Dead Ends of Regulatory Reform
Chapter 9, "Unfree Speech: The Future of Regulatory
'Reform,'" is a reprise of Smith's criticisms of the regulatory
approach to campaign finance and a critique of the current
proposals that embody that approach, most notably the
McCain-Feingold Bill. Smith begins by noting that as
government grows and elections proliferate there is a need for
more campaign finance rather than less, especially in the
United States, which "spends" less on campaigns and
campaign communication per eligible voter than many other
modern democracies. 9' Elections matter more than ever before,
so why would we possibly want to conduct them with fewer
resources than ever before? That is why bills like McCain-
Feingold, which are avowedly about getting certain kinds of
money "out of politics," seem to be such a big step in precisely
the wrong direction.
In various incarnations, such bills serve to limit speech and
91. SMrrH, supra note 8, at 42.
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insulate incumbents from challenge. First, in various ways,
they would reduce the amount of funds available to
candidates. Some provisions would pressure candidates to
accept "voluntary" spending ceilings by offering various
incentives like free or sharply reduced television rates or
increased contribution limits. Usually, the "voluntary" limits
are pro-incumbent because they are set at just the level where
challengers could start waging competitive campaigns against
incumbents. Other provisions would ban PACs entirely or
prohibit candidates from receiving contributions from out-of-
state or out-of-district. While many PACs represent entrenched
and powerful interests, others are vehicles that give voice to
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of individual
Americans. PACs allow these individuals to pool their
relatively small contributions into larger and more effective
voices that will support challengers or candidates
ideologically-attuned with the contributors.
Second, the bills would attack "issue advocacy," which has
long been held constitutionally immune from the reach of
campaign finance laws. As the courts have made clear, from
the impeachment ad case through Buckley and dozens of later
decisions, independent groups and individuals who comment
on, criticize, praise, support, or oppose the actions or stands of
candidates may not be subject to campaign finance regulation
unless their speech "expressly advocates" the election or defeat
of those candidates.92 This rule, properly compelled by the First
Amendment, is necessary to protect vital issue discussion from
the campaign finance regulatory machine. In recent years the
reform movement has attacked this rule by arguing that many
issue ads are really "sham issue ads" or "phony issue ads" that
are the functional equivalent of campaign ads. The critics claim
that the ads are designed to affect electoral outcomes while
steering clear of regulation by avoiding what are pejoratively
called the "magic words," such as "vote for" or "vote against."
Instead, the ads often criticize a candidate and then urge
citizens to contact that candidate. The proposed remedy:
Regulate or even ban any advertisement broadcast or run
92- See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42-45 (1976); FEC v. Christian Action
Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997); FEC v. Central Long Island Tax
Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
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within sixty days of an election that even mentions the name of
a person who is running for federal office.'
Such an incredibly overbroad rule would insulate politicians,
especially incumbents, from much effective criticism of their
records or positions during an election season. It would also
prevent any effective public commentary on legislative
proposals pending during that blackout period because one
could not mention the name of any legislator, either a sponsor
or the one to contact. Thus, for example, it would be a crime to
run an ad criticizing the McCain-Feingold Bill if either McCain
or Feingold were a candidate for federal office. Had Senator
McCain's bill been the law during the 2000 presidential
primary season (a series of federal elections spanning six
months), any organized public criticism of the McCain-
Feingold Bill would be potentially illegal. Therefore, a bill that
Senator McCain had premised his entire presidential campaign
on could not be publicly challenged by those who questioned
it. While there have been some recent academic efforts to justify
such a restraint,94 the courts have spoken with almost one voice
in rejecting legislative or administrative attempts to water
down the express advocacy doctrine.95
Finally, perhaps the most well-known feature of these reform
proposals is the effort to ban soft-money fund raising by
political parties. This too would benefit incumbents and hurt
challengers. Parties raise soft money from sources that are
barred from directly contributing to candidates-corporations,
unions and rich individuals and use it for activities not directly
93. Section 201 of the McCain-Feingold Bill defines an "electioneering
communication" as "any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which...
refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; [and] is made within 60
days before a general, special, or runoff election for such Federal office; or 30 days
before a primary or preference election or caucus of a party that has authority to
nominate a candidate, for such Federal office; and is made to an audience that
includes members of the electorate for such election, convention, or caucus." S.22,
107th Cong. § 201(3)(A) (2001) (passed by Senate April 2, 2001). Because of the
breadth of coverage, the section has to explicitly exempt broadcast media
themselves. See id. at § 201(B)(i).
94. See Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1751 (1999); Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for
Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 265 (2000). But see Lillian R. BeVier, Mandatory Disclosure, "Sham Issue
Advocacy," and Buckley v. Valeo: A Response to Professor Hasen, 48 UCLA L. REV.
285 (2000).
95. See cases cited supra note 92.
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connected with federal campaigns, such as issue advocacy,
recruitment and development of candidates at the state and
local level, printing slate cards, bumper stickers, and other
party paraphernalia, voter registration activity, and get-out-
the-vote drives. All of these activities, many of which are also
engaged in by corporations, unions, and even church groups,
are the stuff of democracy. In addition, parties are particularly
helpful in supporting challengers to incumbents. Yet, the
proposed bills, because of the insistence that soft money
contributions to parties "corrupt the process," would
completely outlaw such funding and thereby eliminate the
parties' ability to engage in all of this grassroots activity. To
starve political parties out of concern for the attenuated
possibility of undue influence or, more likely, special access, is
a remedy that throws out the baby with the bath water.
Nor, Professor Smith suggests, should we start down the
road of total public funding of campaigns, which will result in
less speech and which will inevitably result in pressures to
regulate outside voices that are not subject to the limits that
will inevitably accompany full public funding. After all, why
limit the candidates through conditions on public funding
while outside groups and the news media remain free to
campaign and effect electoral outcomes without limit? How
long do you think politicians will stand for that wild card?
Even worse and bordering on totalitarian are schemes, so far
happily confined to the pages of law reviews, that would
assign to each citizen a government voucher representing a
small and equal amount of campaign resources, say $100 per
person.96 The citizen would then give that voucher to a
candidate, party, or cause, or perhaps spend that $100
themselves, for political speech or activity. No other funding of
politics would be allowed. All citizens would be allowed $100
of political input and influence-no more, no less. This would
not, however, deal with the problem of privately-owned-and-
funded issue organizations, foundations, news media, and
internal membership communications by corporations, labor
unions, and enormous groups like the League of Women
Voters or AARP, which could seriously influence the climate of
96. See SMITH, supra note 8, at 153.
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public opinion. Beyond that, there would also be the problem
of funding speech about ballot questions and initiatives, not to
mention the funding of all lobbying activity, which can
certainly impact legislative outcomes. Some of the proposals
would require newspapers to fund their editorial endorsements
out of individual citizen coupons or vouchers.97 One hardly
knows whether to label such proposals utopian, quixotic, or
totalitarian. Winston Smith might find them familiar," but
James Madison certainly would not.9 It is hard to imagine
anything further from the minds of the framers than such total
government control over political speech.
B. Open Roads
So, then, what can be done? Professor Smith's book
concludes with a number of prescriptions. First, he urges us to
abandon the fixation that limiting or eliminating private
financing of campaigns will achieve equality, level the playing
field, deliver the promise of "one person, one vote," or
otherwise achieve an egalitarian nirvana. Getting the money
out of politics will result in the injection into politics of things
controlled by other elites: media elites, including reporters,
writers, editors, and publishers, who control the channels of
communication and who, are often decidedly partisan in their
views; entertainment elites who can command popular support
and attention; professional elites who provide critical political
advice and counsel; and academic and cultural elites who can
change the political and social culture in which politics goes
forward and thereby set the terms of the public debate. It is a
chimera to try to go from equality of vote at the ballot box on
election day to equality of political influence all year long.
Second, we should stop equating attempts to use one's
97. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 90.
98. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1948).
99. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 405 games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an ailment without which it
instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which
is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be
to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it
imparts to fire its destructive agency.
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resources to influence the outcome of elections or the passage
of legislation with "corruption." That is not corruption-it is
politics and democracy. "[W]e must recognize that campaign
contributions are not the same as votes. Money is not stuffed
into ballot boxes; winners are not determined by counting
donations or net worth.1 '0 Instead, "we must make an honest
assessment of the level of corruption that exists in
government," and realize that campaign finance does not
involve legislators' lining their pockets for their personal use
and rarely involves legislators changing their position on
legislation in direct response to campaign contributions or
support.'
If limits are not the answer, is disclosure? Chief Justice
Warren Burger thought that disclosure was a less drastic and
more appropriate remedy for the concern with corruption and
undue influence flowing from campaign contributions.0 2 The
ACLU has supported disclosure of large contributions to
mainstream party candidates for similar reasons."13 Professor
Smith, however, flouting conventional wisdom on this point as
well, reminds us that disclosure as a solution also has serious
problems. Disclosure violates the right to engage in or support
speech anonymously that protects the speaker or the supporter
against retaliation and chilling effect. By Smith's lights,
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,1 °4 which rejected the need
for and the validity of disclosure of the name of a person who
printed and distributed leaflets, should be the norm. Indeed,
other than the Buckley Court's upholding of disclosure of the
names of persons who gave even as little as $11 to a political
campaign, the only other time the Court has upheld disclosure
of political activity is in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Board,°5 where the Court, in what was not its finest
100. SMITH, supra note 8, at 215.
101. Id. at 217.
102. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 236 (1976) (Burger, CJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
103. See American Civil Liberties Union, Policy #35: Free Speech for
Government Officials and Personnel Policy, in Policy Guide of the American Civil
Liberties Union 75, 75-76 (1986) (unpublished document) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library).
104. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
105. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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hour, upheld government registration and disclosure of the
American Communist Party. The better rule is the one
fashioned in McIntyre and a line of cases protecting the right of
the NAACP and other organizations to not disclose the
identities of their members and supporters.106 That should be
the constitutional norm.
In Smith's refreshing perspective, we should judge
candidates on the basis of their ideas, their stands on issues,
and their actions in office, not on the basis of who supports
them. After all, as Curtis Gans likes to point out, the most
progressive and far-reaching liberal legislative achievements of
the last half of the 20th century, including public policy
landmarks like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, the Medicare Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean
Water Act, were passed in a time when politicians often
received campaign contributions in cash in brown paper bags
with no disclosure whatsoever.' 7 The link between campaign
finance controls and good government is not inextricable.
So, no limits, no public funding, and, it turns out, no
disclosure. What is left to provide our campaign finance rules
and serve as our system for funding and managing our
politics? Professor Smith has an answer:
There is a system, however, that can meet the criteria of a
successful regulatory system-that is, one that is flexible and
easy to administer; that provides adequate information to
voters; that lowers barriers to political activity and fosters
competitiveness; that combats alleged influence peddling
and increases official accountability; and that promotes true
equality. It is one with which Americans are familiar, even if
it has, at times, been forgotten in the enthusiasm to regulate
campaign finance in recent years .... 108
It is, of course, the First Amendment. It would not just be,
Smith observes, a libertarian barrier to government regulation
of speech, although it is surely at least that. It would also serve
as a governing document that sets the terms in which elections
should be conducted: freedom of speech and press are assured
106. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
107. See 143 CONG. REC. S10,133-35 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Bennet) (quoting Curtis Gans).
108. SMrrH, supra note 8, at 225.
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to ensure that voters will get as much information as possible
to make an informed choice at the polls; government is kept
out of the political debate as much as possible in order to
assure a full debate and a minimum amount of incumbent self-
dealing; and excessive regulation of political activity is
prohibited so that grassroots and citizen advocates can be
heard. Professor Smith concludes that, since 1907, we have
attempted to regulate political speech in the guise of campaign
finance reform and that this has been folly. The solution to this
folly, as well as the best campaign reform law ever written, is
readily at hand. It begins: "Congress shall make no law .... "
